|
Vaclav Smil, Energy at the Crossroads: Global
Perspectives and Uncertainties. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003. ISBN
0262194929. Chapter 6, Page 317
Anybody even cursorily familiar with the current state of
principal energy conversion techniques appreciates the enormous
opportunities for using fuels and electricity more efficiently…. Whatever
the future gains may be, the historical evidence is clear: Higher efficiency
of energy conversions leads eventually to higher, rather than lower, energy
use, and eventually we will have to accept some limits on the global
consumption of fuels and electricity.
From the Alliance to Save Energy’s
website, January 24, 2004 WHAT’S ENERGY?
http://www.ase.org/powersmart/whtsenrgy.html
Energy used to heat your home and power your TV is not too
different from the energy your body gets when you eat a bean burrito. Your
body is like a powerhouse, turning food (fuel) into usable energy— the
ability to do work—and eliminating waste byproducts.
A power plant does the same thing: Coal, oil, or natural gas
(nonrenewable fossil fuels) goes in and gets burned up to power a big
generator that sends energy to your house, with carbon dioxide, some noxious
gases, and/or sludge as byproducts.
The problem: Fossil fuels (from fossils, or remains, of dead
animals and plants) take millions of years to make. The volume of
byproducts created when we burn fossil fuels are not easily reprocessed in
our environment and cause pollution and related health problems.
Energy production and use account for nearly 80 percent of
air pollution, more than 88 percent of greenhouse gas emissions, and more
environmental damage than any other human activity.
Energy
Efficiency vs. Energy Conservation
Energy efficiency is a far cry from old energy conservation
images. It’s not turning down the thermostat and sacrificing comfort. Energy
efficiency means getting the most from every energy unit by using
state-of-the-art technologies to provide daily needs— comfortable homes,
profitable businesses, convenient transportation. It is the single most
immediate, cost-effective way to reduce energy use and pollution.
If your house were energy efficient, you could lower your
thermostat and be comfortable day and night, without drafts, cold spots, or
guilt while doing your share for your family, your finances, and your
environment.
If you replaced just four 100-watt incandescent bulbs that
burn four or more hours a day in your home with four 23-watt fluorescent
bulbs, you’d get as much light and save at least 1,356 kilowatt-hours of
electricity and $108 over three years. If all our nation’s households did
the same, we’d save as much energy as is consumed by some seven million cars
in one year.
Join our “treasure hunt” to discover ways to save home energy
and money. Gain the Power$mart edge—the knowledge and power to make
energy-efficient choices. The brochure’s Power$mart Tips highlight
efficient technologies and approaches, while its Energy Consciousness Tips
provide the best energy-saving conservation behaviors. Together, they
produce maximum results.
Mithra Moezzi and Maithili Iyer, Lawrence Berkley National
Laboratory, “What Else is Transfered Along with Energy Efficiency?” Human
and Social Dimensions of Energy Use: Understanding Markets and Demand.
2002 Summer Study of the American Council for an
Energy Efficient Economy.
Page 8.204
Our argument is not that technologies in general don’t often
make people more comfortable or otherwise better off given the
subjectivities of these notions. But perhaps a good deal of the core of
this concept of “standards of living” is supplied by mandates to consume and
control that inhere in technology, its marketing, and its infrastructure.
Whatever one may think of the morals of this, the idea that promoting
control through energy efficiency actually reduces energy consumption and
carbon emissions deserves critical and multi-disciplinary reflection. The
current levels and configuration of standards and codes in the United States
are not absolute and technically perfect. Rather, they have been shaped by
extraneous factors such as manufacturer interests and changing definitions
of comfort; they thus often follow technological trajectories which bring
the “final” configuration something much different than might be consider
socially reasonable).
Though the Green Revolution is often described as increasing
agricultural productivity, it also replaced older methods of farming with
new, more resource-intensive methods that basically increased the yield on
the basis of higher inputs. There was no double-speak about what it was
meant to accomplish: it was a new way of doing agriculture. Like the Green
Revolution, such programs are justified on the basis of reducing
environmental impacts, and opening up trade. And also like the Green
revolution, there are both stated and unstated motivations for providing
assistance.
We draw attention to the fact that there is a lack of
consideration of key types of applicable experience and analysis, for
example, theories from anthropology, social studies of technology, and past
experiences of technology transfer. Attending to such experience is
critical to the development and execution of standard and codes, if they are
to fulfill the objectives of the transfer program. Technical assistance
affects far more than “just” technology. Thus assistance programs like
those we consider here cannot legitimately separate their responsibility
from pre-assessing potential impacts, direct or indirect, technical,
economic, or social. To do this requires engaging in discussions with
specialists from disciplines outside of those now in the formal
policy-making arena.
In 1999 the American Water Works Association’s Research
Foundation published a study of Residential End Uses of Water.
http://www.waterwiser.org/frameset.cfm?b=2&wateruse=1.
They studied 1,188 homes in 12 sites, with 28,015 logged days
of residential water use. They found that 42% of water use was indoor and
58% outdoor. While variations in water use depended on obvious factors such
as lot size and climate, they also determined that:
The great water
myth -- Mexican farmers are being urged to 'save' water by investing in
more efficient irrigation. But the initiative may have the opposite
effect. Fred Pearce reports on the makings of an environmental
disaster. 28 January 2004, Independent Digital (UK) Ltd
In a world of growing water shortages,
farmers are becoming convinced that they need to grow, "more crops for every
drop." Water efficiency is all the rage in an industry that uses two-thirds
of the world's water. But could the farmers be wrong?
From the corn fields of Mexico to the paddy
fields of China to the lettuce plantations of California, farmers are
discovering that a few simple inexpensive techniques, such as lining
irrigation canals to prevent leaks and delivering water directly to plant
roots rather than flood fields, could cut world water use by a quarter or
more.
The World Bank and aid agencies are pouring
money into water efficiency. The water saved is being earmarked for growing
more crops; for refilling empty rivers; and even for resolving international
disputes. It could solve the US's current dispute with Mexico for not
delivering all the water to Texas which was promised under a 1944
water-sharing treaty.
And yet one of the World Bank's chief
advisers on water, Stephen Foster of the British Geological Survey, is
horrified by the idea that making irrigation more efficient will free water
for other uses. "It has the makings of a very dangerous myth," he says.
There is, he adds, a horrible flaw in the
argument. Most of the water being "saved" is never truly wasted in the first
place. Some, it is true, is lost to evaporation. But most - the water that
seeps underground from fields and canals - eventually finds its way to
nature's underground water reservoirs, from which millions of farmers
subsequently pump water to supplement river water for irrigation.
This water is not being wasted at all,
merely put into store; "saving" it will simply empty the water store. The
repercussions, says Foster, could spell hydrological catastrophe in
countries such as Mexico and India that rely increasingly on underground
water for irrigation.
Andrew Keller of the International Water
Management Institute, a World Bank-backed research body, agrees. In a recent
paper, he argued that, "the classical concept of irrigation efficiency can
lead to serious mismanagement of scarce water resources, because it ignores
the potential re-use of irrigation return flows."
And that is what seems to be happening on
the banks of the Rio Grande, on the border between Texas and the Mexican
state of Chihuahua. After more than a decade of drought, this is a region
desperately short of water. And the river is failing. In its middle
stretches, downstream of El Paso, the Rio Grande is virtually empty. All the
water has been taken by cities and farmers upstream, where the river is
entirely within the US. The river only recovers a little when a new
tributary, the Rio Conchos, arrives from Mexico bringing a small but
significant flow.
Well done to the Mexicans, you might say.
But Texas is not so charitable, for the Mexicans are in default of a treaty
signed 60 years ago with the US to share the river's flow. Come drought or
flood, the Mexicans are required to deliver at least 350,000 acre-feet of
water to the border. But for the past decade of drought, as their own
reservoirs have emptied, the Mexicans have not delivered enough. They are
now four years behind with their water deliveries.
Texas farmers are angry, but Mexican farmers
shrug their shoulders. "We have no water to give," one told me. "How can we
give the Texans what we don't have ourselves?" But unless they make good
soon, the US administration has threatened hydrological retribution by
stopping flows down the other cross-border river, the Colorado, into Mexico.
Water engineers along the border hope they
can stave off a water war. The Border Environment Cooperation Commission (Becc),
a cross-border body set up under the Nafta free trade agreement, is
investing in water-saving measures on Mexican farms in order to help them
meet their treaty obligations.
This summer, engineers are lining the canals
on the largest irrigated area, at Delicias, which waters fields of alfalfa,
pecan and tomatoes for 90 miles along the River Conchos. And proud farmers
there show off the perforated hoses they now run across their fields to
deliver water where once they simply flooded the fields.
The plan is to halve the water use in the
Delicias irrigation district. "The Americans will get what we save," says
Marcial Marquez, chairman of the irrigation district. That, says Gonzalo
Bravo of the Becc, "will be nearly equal to the amount of water Mexico is
required to send to the US under its treaty obligations."
It sounds like a win-win situation, until
you remember that farmers here also use a large amount of underground water
to keep their crops growing, especially during the drought. The worry is
that with less water allowed to percolate from fields into the underground
reserves, those reserves will soon begin to falter.
The Delicias irrigation operations manager
Ezequiel Bueno told me he had no such fears. So far, he explained, there are
only sporadic signs of falling water tables. But local researchers I spoke
to are worried and tell a very different tale.
"Some people think groundwater comes from
Mars and surface water comes from Venus. They just don't realise how
connected they are," says Hector Arias of the conservation group WWF, which
has a project to help save the rivers of the Chihuahua desert. The tragedy
is that, to meet their immediate treaty requirements for delivering water to
Texas farmers, the Mexicans are imperilling the long-term future of their
own underground water reserves. This story, albeit without the troubles of
cross-border antagonism, is being played out in different forms across the
world, as farmers pump ever more water from their underground water reserves
while starving those reserves of the water they need to refill.
So what should happen down on the desert
borderlands between the US and Mexico? Arias says that water managers need a
better understanding of both the water cycle and the sheer scarcity of
water.
Some farmers are taking the hint and giving
up. Terry Bishop at Presidio in Texas is negotiating a deal that will allow
him to sell his share of Rio Grande water - allocated to his land 80 years
ago - to thirsty cities downstream such as Laredo. He would like to carry on
farming, on what he believes is one of the longest continually cultivated
stretches of land in the US. But, "the water is too valuable to stay here,"
he says.
Just over the border from Presidio in
Ojinaga, where huge areas of irrigated farms have been abandoned to the
desert in the past decade for want of water, the Mexican agriculturalist
Humberto Lujan has another idea. He says the future lies in new crops that
need less water. Why not grow ornamental cactuses, he says, or herbs such as
rosemary, or mesquite, a desert shrub that provides both good timber and
cattle fodder with very low water needs?
Lujan has planted a patch of abandoned
farmland with these crops to show how it can be done. If the scheme
succeeds, he says, he may not be producing more crops per drop - but he will
certainly be earning more dollars.
The Top Ten Reasons Why We Need a Renewed Commitment to
Energy Efficiency 2.16.04 Bill Prindle Deputy Director, American Council
for an Energy-Efficient Economy
<http://www.energypulse.net/centers/author.cfm?at_id=435
Looking back on the energy events of 2003 and recent years,
with an eye toward the future, the energy policy experts at ACEEE offer
their top ten reasons for renewing America’s commitment to energy
efficiency.
10. Efficiency is much more than a personal virtue. In the
spring of 2001 senior Administration officials opined that energy
efficiency, while a “personal virtue”, is not a serious energy policy
solution. That same year, the state of California, faced with an electricity
crisis, mounted a multi-pronged energy efficiency program that achieved an
unprecedented 7% reduction in electricity demand, corrected for weather and
economic factors [http://aceee.org/pubs/u021full.pdf]. This reduction in
demand succeeded in preventing any further blackouts in the state and was
the major factor responsible for reducing excessive wholesale prices in the
California power market, saving customers billions of dollars. State
officials close to the situation said it was this demand-side response, led
by energy efficiency, that contained the crisis. This experience has
cemented the role of energy efficiency as a “public good” that has enormous
benefits for our economy and the environment.
9. Efficiency is the key to a sustainable economy. Over the
last 30 years, the energy intensity of the U.S. economy has fallen by more
than 40%. That means that without energy efficiency, we would be using 70%
more energy to support our economic growth. It’s not likely that we could
have found the land, the capital, the infrastructure, or the fuel to sustain
that much demand growth. In faster-growing economies, this is even more
critical. In China, for example, the electricity system is currently
overstrained, threatening several planned factory openings and thus crimping
China’s economic growth. That’s why China is developing some of the world’s
toughest efficiency standards for vehicles and other equipment, and sees
efficiency as a central principle for sustaining a strong economy.
8. Efficiency is no-regrets insurance against global warming.
Most of our greenhouse gas emissions come from energy consumption in
powerplants, factories, buildings, and vehicles. ACEEE research shows that
without efficiency, carbon emissions would be 30% higher today. A 2001 ACEEE
study calculated that the U.S. can reduce its carbon emissions back to 1990
levels by 2020, through cost-effective policies such as appliance standards,
building codes, public benefits funds, fuel economy standards, accelerated
use of combined heat and power, and tax incentives [http://www.aceee.org/pubs/e012full.pdf].
These measures will help, not hurt, the economy; so regardless of the
ultimate relationship between energy use and climate, energy efficiency
investments are a “no-regrets” insurance policy that will provide net
benefits in any case.
7. Efficiency can cut powerplant waste in half. Our aging
powerplant fleet (average age approaching 50 years), with a typical thermal
efficiency of less than 35%, wastes more than one-quarter of all the energy
consumed in the United States. Modern combined heat and power (CHP) systems
offer a form of distributed generation that attains net thermal efficiencies
up to 80%. ACEEE research estimates that over 150 GW of power generation
capacity could be developed as CHP between now and 2020 [http://www.aceee.org/pubs/ie983.htm],
which is almost half of forecast demand (and would be over half of forecast
demand if rigorous end-use efficiency were pursued in the electricity
sector). To get CHP’s benefits, however, we need fair and consistent
national interconnection standards, and we need state utility tariff
policies that eliminate predatory pricing for standby and supplemental
power. We also need air quality policies that allocate emissions based on
useful output, not on fuel input, and that streamline permitting for smaller
facilities.
6. Efficiency policies are needed to overcome barriers and
market failures. Academic economists often theorize that market forces spur
the optimal level of investment in energy efficiency, and that public
policies to increase efficiency are not needed. These theorists ignore the
realities of the marketplace, which throw up numerous market barriers and
cause markets to fail to make optimum efficiency investments. For example:
·
Builder-Buyer. Homebuilders, appliance
manufacturers, automakers, and other producers of energy-using equipment are
more concerned about up-front cost that operating cost. They compete based
on reducing the first cost of their product, not the operating cost to the
user. They thus often fail to offer more energy-efficient models that may
cost a little more initially but would minimize consumers’ life-cycle costs.
This “builder-buyer” barrier is why appliance standards, building codes, and
fuel economy standards are needed to keep efficiency levels improving.
·
Information Gap. Energy-using technology
is sold to millions of homeowners, car buyers, and other consumers, many of
whom don’t understand the science or economics of efficiency, and thus don’t
know what to look for in a product. This lack of information and awareness
makes efficiency invisible in many markets, making it hard to sell the
benefits of efficiency compared to the more obvious attributes of the
product. To bridge this “information barrier”, we need labeling and branding
programs like Energy Star to make efficiency more visible to consumers.
·
Split Incentives. More than a quarter of American homes, and
more than half of American offices, are rented. That means the
landlord typically pays for energy-using equipment, but the tenant typically
pays the energy bill. And in larger organizations, procurement people buy
equipment on low-bid principles, accounting people pay energy bills, and
engineering people keep facilities
running, splitting the responsibility for energy efficiency. These
“split-incentive” barriers increase the need for building codes, appliance
standards, and public benefits funds to reach these sectors.
·
Utility Dependence on Energy Sales. For
most utilities and energy suppliers, shareholder return is tied to the
amount of energy sold through the utility system. Under the typical state
rate regulation system, reductions in energy sales mean lost revenues and
lost returns to shareholders. This makes most utilities natural opponents to
energy efficiency investments. Some states, such as California and Oregon,
have “de-coupled” revenues from energy sales or pursued other regulatory
mechanisms to overcome this predisposition to increase unit sales. Such
approaches can allow utility companies to operate efficiency programs
without sacrificing profitability.
5. Energy efficiency means economic prosperity. Efficiency is
an engine of sustainable economic growth. If we had not become 40% more
efficient in recent decades, we would be spending an extra $400 billion a
year on energy, above the current $600 billion we now spend. This would
divert an extra 4% of our GDP to energy costs, costing us over $1000 per
person in direct energy bills plus increased costs for the products and
services we buy. Energy efficient products and services already account for
tens of billions of dollars of direct sales, and drive a growing number of
jobs, investments, and profit margins. So there is no conflict between
energy efficiency and a thriving economy. In fact, efficiency is a
foundation of economic strength.
4. Energy efficiency clears the air. Since the majority of
regulated air pollutants come from powerplant smokestacks or vehicle
tailpipes, energy efficiency policies that reduce electricity use or vehicle
energy use also reduce air pollution. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990
made specific provisions for utilities to use energy efficiency as an
emission reduction option [http://aceee.org/pubs/u034full.pdf]. EPA’s
nitrogen oxides emission reduction regulations have recognized the value of
energy efficiency in reducing those emissions. The State of Texas, in
seeking to meet its NOx deadlines, implemented a statewide building energy
code in 2001 because of its emission reduction benefits. States in the
Northeast are banding together to use energy efficiency as part of a
comprehensive strategy to cut air pollution across the region. Yet federal
legislative initiatives such as the Administration’s Clear Skies bill fail
to recognize these benefits, and don’t allow end-use efficiency and other
indirect emission reduction strategies as part of their compliance regimes.
This omission should be corrected so that energy efficiency is a recognized
source of emission reductions.
3. Energy efficiency is vital to national security. Defense
and foreign policy professionals agree that our oil dependence on volatile
regions such as the Middle East is a key threat to U.S national security.
The fact is that without the fuel economy improvements we’ve achieved since
the 1970s, we would be importing another 4 million barrels of oil a day,
putting Middle East oil producers more firmly in the driver’s seat.
Because Gulf producers continue to control the world’s
low-cost marginal or “swing” production capacity, modest changes in world
oil demand have an enormous effect on their economic and political power.
And since the U. S. consumes over one-quarter of world oil supply, we are a
critical “swing” consumer. It was the fall in U.S. oil demand in the 1980s
that initially weakened the OPEC cartel, but surging sales of lower-mileage
SUVs have accordingly driven U.S. demand back up in the last decade. ACEEE
research shows that, using today’s technology, we can improve our fuel
economy by 50% over a 10-15 year period, with a 5% increase in vehicle cost
and net lifetime savings to the buyer [http://www.aceee.org/energy/cafe.pdf].
But since automakers have strong negative incentives to build higher-mileage
vehicles, we need strong new fuel economy standards, tax incentives, and
other means to reduce our transportation oil demand.
2. Energy efficiency keeps the lights on. On August 14, 2003,
up to 50 million people in the U.S and Canada lost power in the largest
blackout in North American history. While the immediate cause has been
linked to power system operating practices and outmoded transmission
technologies in parts of the U.S. grid, the fact remains that this emergency
happened on a hot weekday afternoon, when air conditioning demand pushed the
system to the breaking point. Excess customer demand overheats
transformers, overloads transmission lines, and strains any of the other
weak points in the power system. So while we need clearer operating
standards and a rationalized regulatory system for U.S transmission systems,
we also need to invest in energy efficiency and other forms of demand
response to keep both the physical infrastructure and the financial markets
of our electricity system in balance. Efficiency investments have already
avoided the need for more than 30,000 MW of peak capacity; ACEEE research
shows that by targeting investment in efficiency programs that have maximum
peak impact, we could avoid another 64,000 MW of peak demand [http://www.aceee.org/utility/index.htm].
These savings would not only reduce strain on the grid during peak hours, thereby reducing
the risk of blackout, they would also exert strong leverage on peak power
prices, saving money for all customers on the system.
1. Efficiency is our first line of defense against soaring
natural gas prices. The biggest energy story of 2003 has been the
realization, right up to the desk of the Chairman of the Federal Reserve,
that North America’s natural gas markets are changing dramatically, and that
this is not a short-term blip but a long-term structural shift. Demand has
outstripped, and is expected to continue to outpace, our continental
production capacity. A new floor is appearing under gas prices: from the
soft $2/MCF wellhead prices of the 1990s, market forecasters are projecting
wholesale prices at $4.50/MCF and up for the foreseeable future. New supply
investments, such as the Alaskan pipeline and LNG imports, will take years
to come on line, and depend on higher gas prices to be financially viable.
Energy efficiency is one of the few realistic policy strategies that can
bring balance to natural gas markets, both for the next few years and for
the longer term. A 2003 ACEEE study shows that modest efficiency gains of 2%
or less can have major price impacts in tight gas markets, driving down
wholesale prices by about 20% or $1/MCF over the next five years. Pursuing
this strategy would save consumers over $100 billion on a total investment
of just over $30 billion, including a $7 billion public policy cost.
[http://www.aceee.org/energy/efnatgas-study.htm]. In this brave new world of
pricey and volatile natural gas markets, energy efficiency is a key hedging
strategy that can help get us through what could otherwise be an
economically devastating problem.
On and Off are
Not the Same: The Case for Conservation in an Efficient World by Paul
Grover, Kilawatt Partners 444 Juniper Ridge Shelburne, VT 05482 802
985-2285
The State of Vermont has the nation’s first statewide energy
efficiency utility. This was a landmark development, but now it is time to
take the next step.
Hopefully, no Vermonter gets up in the morning and says,
“Today, I am going to waste energy.” We are smarter than that: we see the
value in using only the electricity we need. Our motives to use less energy
may be ethical or practical. Some say that exhausting our non-renewable
energy resources is robbing future generations of the same benefits we have
enjoyed. Others know that reducing electricity costs increases profits and
visibility.
When discussing the future of Vermont’s energy challenges,
most people, even those in the “business”, use the terms “efficiency” and
“conservation” interchangeably. This may turn out to be a grave mistake.
When we understand just how different these terms are, the solutions to our
energy problems, present and future, become much clearer.
Efficiency
Engineers originally created the term “efficiency” to
quantify the performance of machines. Efficiency compares the energy we put
into a machine with what comes out of the machine. If you put 100 energy
units into a motor that produces 60 units of motor energy, that motor is 60%
efficient. All things being equal, a more efficient machine uses less
energy than a less efficient machine.
What people may not realize is that “energy efficient”
equipment must be on to produce energy savings. And second, the
longer it’s on, the more we “save.” The message is that it is fine to use
as much energy as we want as long as we use it efficiently.
Efficiency enables Vermonters to get more from what they use,
without limits. For example, more efficient cars get more miles per gallon,
yet we use more gas every year by driving more miles per vehicle, driving
faster, driving alone and driving shorter trips. Deep down, efficiency
tells us that the more we drive our efficient cars, the more gasoline we
“save,” so, we are off the hook. Efficiency is like buying low-fat potato
chips to “save” calories and then feeling good about eating the whole bag as
part of our diet.
This approach to saving energy is not good news for our
environment, our health or our increasing dependence on unstable foreign
energy resources. When confronted with this view, efficiency proponents
argue that resource use would have gone up even faster had we not funded
efficiency equipment with taxpayer dollars. This is like continuing the
same losing strategy over and over in a football game, only to be surprised
at the resulting score!
Conservation
Energy conservation is quite different from energy
efficiency. The late Fred Tuttle best summed up “conservation” when he told
me, “If y’ don’t need it, turn the durn thing off.” The goal of
conservation is to minimize resource use and eliminate waste. While
efficiency gets us more bang for the buck when equipment is on,
conservation gives us even greater benefit when that same equipment is
off.
While efficiency and conservation may have the same motives,
nothing beats energy conservation. This simple example illustrates
the difference:
-
After we turn
on a light, our concern is efficiency, or how to get a high ratio of light
from the electricity used, without limit.
-
When we turn
that light off, we are certain to conserve energy. We preserve energy
resources whether the bulb is energy efficient or not. In fact, the more
inefficient the bulb is, the more we save.
If energy efficiency is our only concern, very efficient
lights are lit whether we need them on or not. The longer we burn our
energy efficient bulbs, the more we “save.” Efficiency can waste a lot of
electricity.
But, we might ask, doesn’t efficiency reduce the demand for
energy resources? After all, since 1992, the State of Vermont has mandated
that our utilities, and now Efficiency Vermont, motivate Vermonters to
purchase energy efficient equipment – lamps, ballasts, motors, milk coolers,
homes, and so on. The fact is that after spending many millions of
ratepayer dollars on efficiency, electricity use per commercial and
industrial customer in Vermont has increased during this period, not
decreased since 1992. For example, between 1992 and 2001, electricity use
per Vermont business increased 8%, even with the recession.
So, what about energy conservation? For the past couple of
years, I have been working with Vermont homeowners and business people to
analyze what they have turned on, when it needs to be on and how to safely
turn it off when it’s not needed. It’s a blend of Yankee ingenuity and
old-fashioned common sense, like Fred Tuttle’s. Most of the businesses
with which I work have already invested in energy-efficient equipment. And
yet, we can find ways to reduce their electricity use by 30-40% with returns
on investment of less of 25% or more, compared to multi-year paybacks for
investing in energy efficiency equipment. Such successes demonstrate just
how much electricity and fossil fuels we all waste and how cost-effective it
is to stop this waste. This is good news for our environment, our climate
and our health – and it decreases our dependence on foreign energy
resources.
From a policy point of view, these successes also demonstrate
the shortcomings of solely promoting efficiency. In this case, we must
invest in efficient products and landfill the old ones. And those products
must be on to realize savings. Much greater energy savings come from using
our existing technology only when necessary. It’s not just the car we own,
it’s how much gas we use. It’s not the type of lamp we buy that’s most
important, it’s how and when we use the light switch. And, it is not up to
the State of Vermont or our electric utilities to create our energy future,
it’s up to you and me.
So here is the bottom line. Efficiency and conservation are
not the same. Conservation means increased comfort and productivity, since
no one will miss the energy we waste. Conservation and efficiency produce
very different results. And finally, using more is not using less and on
and off are not the same.
Cook, Earl Ferguson, Man,
Energy, Society, Freeman.: 1976 ISBN 071670725X,
Page 135
|
|
Per Capita Daily Energy
in kcal |
|
Type of Society |
Gross Input |
Gross Output |
Approximate aggregate efficiency |
|
Subsistence
agricultural |
5,000 |
500 |
10% |
|
Advanced
agricultural |
20,000 |
3,000 |
15% |
|
Emerging
industrial |
60,000 |
15,000 |
25% |
|
Advanced
industrial |
120,000 |
42,000 |
35% |
|
Industrial
technological |
225,000 |
81,000 |
36% |
Roseland, Mark. Toward Sustainable Communities.
Canada: 1998. ISBN 086571374X , Pages 1 and 2
Canadians and Americans consume more energy per capita than
any other nation. Environmental impacts of our consumptive lifestyles
include ozone layer depletion, acid rain, smog, potential climate change,
and other forms of pollution and environmental degradation. Our addiction
to energy also manifests itself in congested roads, urban sprawl, excessive
heating, cooling, lighting, and ventilation expenditures in buildings,
costly inefficiencies in commercial and industrial equipment, weaker local
economies, and excessive taxes.
Citizens and their governments hold tremendous power to
change our patterns of consumption and support sustainable ways of using
energy resources. Designing more energy-efficient buildings, and
retrofitting existing homes, office and civic buildings saves millions of
dollars in energy expenditures, and frees up money for investment in
schools, hospitals, community economic development, and a more secure
future.
Reducing consumption is usually more cost-effective than
expanding supply. By increasing efficiency, the same amount of electricity
cam serve more users without requiring massive capital investments to expand
power plant capacity.
If additional supply is needed, renewable energy production,
such as wind power and photovoltaic (solar) power, as well as cogeneration
are more sustainable options. For heating options, technologies such as
ground-source heat pumps and districts heating, are more efficient and
environmentally responsible than most conventional heating systems.
By encouraging energy efficiency and clean, renewable or
efficient energy supply strategies, communities foster local self-reliance
and economic diversification. This is not science fiction—these are
“off-the-shelf” technologies and techniques that are available today. All
that is required is public and political will.
Energy-efficiency simply means “more bang for your buck.” It
implies use of products, such as refrigerators, lightbulbs, washing
machines, computers, printers, copiers, industrial motor systems, air
conditioners, space heaters, and ventilation systems that deliver the same
service as other units, but with a fraction of the energy or electricity
demands. Energy-efficient building use strategies and technologies, such as
passive solar design, light shelves, light-tubes, and high-performance
windows, to reduce energy consumption by minimizing or even elimination the
need for heating, cooling, ventilation systems, and day-time lighting.
Campbell, Colin J., and Jean H. Laherrere. The End of
Cheap Oil. Scientific American, March 1998,
Page 81
Predicting when oil production will stop rising is relatively
straightforward once one has a good estimate of how much oil there is left
to produce. We simply apply a refinement of a technique first published in
1956 by M. King Hubbert. Hubbert observed that in any large region,
unrestrained extraction of a finite resource rises along a bell-shaped curve
that peaks when about half the resource is gone. To demonstrate his theory,
Hubbert fitted a bell curve to production statistics and projected that
crude oil production in the lower 48 U.S. states would rise for 13 more
years, then crest in 1969, give or take a year. He was right: production
peaked in 1970 and has continued to follow Hubbert curves with only minor
deviations. The flow of oil from several other regions, such as the former
Soviet Union and the collection of all oil producers outside the Middle
East, also follows Hubbert curves quite faithfully.
The global picture is more complicated, because the Middle
East members of OPEC deliberately reined back their oil exports in the
1970s, while other nations continued producing at full capacity. Our
analysis reveals that a number of the largest producers, including Norway
and the U.K., will reach their peaks around the turn of the millennium
unless they sharply curtail production. By 2002 or so the world will rely
on Middle East nations, particularly five near Persian Gulf (Iran, Iraq,
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates), to fill in the gap
between dwindling supply and growing demand. But once approximately 900 Gbo
gave been consumed, production must soon begin to fall.
Barring a global recession, it seems most likely that world
production of conventional oil will peak during the first decade of the 21st
century.
More on peak oil:
http://www.hubbertpeak.com/
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3777413.stm
Is the world’s oil running out fast?
By Adam Porter at the Peak Oil conference in Berlin
If you think oil prices are high at $40 a barrel then wait
till they are four times that much. How will you pay to run your car? How
will you get the children to school?How will you heat your house? How much
will transported food go up in price?
How will we pay for plastics, metals, rubber, cheap flights,
Simpson’s DVDs, 3G phones and everlasting economic growth? The basic answer
is, we won’t. This is the message from the Association for the Study of Peak
Oil (ASPO). The group of oil executives, geologists, investment bankers,
academics and others has been warning the world of high oil prices, and the
ensuing fallout, for some years now.
The end of cheap oil
It includes a diverse range of oil industry insiders. People
like Ali Bakhtiari, head of strategic planning at Iran’s National il Company
(NOIC), Dr Colin Campbell, a former executive vice president of Total-Fina,
and Matthew Simmons, an energy investment banker and adviser to the
controversial Bush-Cheney energy plan. They are united by one idea, that
global oil production is about to peak, which in turn will signal the
permanent end of cheap oil. And they warn that this is the foundation of the
current rise in oil prices.
Who hurts when prices explode?
“Oil is far too cheap at the moment,” says Mr Simmons. “The
figure I’d use is around $182 a barrel. We need to price oil realistically
to control its demand. That is because global production is peaking.”
Large new oil fields are ever more difficult to find
“If we price oil correctly,” Mr Simmons says, “it could give
us time to find bridge fuels, fuels to fill the gap between an oil economy
and a renewable economy. But I don’t see that happening.” The adherents of
the peak oil theory warn the decline of world oil output will force oil
prices higher for good, and that the knock on effects could be catastrophic.
“In my opinion, unfortunately, there will be no linear
change,” says Iran’s Ali Bakhtiari. “There will only be sudden explosive
change.”
“The people who will be least affected will be the super
poor, who already have no access to energy, and the super rich who do not
care if oil is $100 a barrel.”
“It is everyone who is in the middle who will be hurt the
most,” says Mr Bakhtiari. “When the crisis comes there will be enormous
changes.”
Oil rationing?
Dr Campbell says endless growth is not possible
Much of ASPO’s predictions stem from the calculations of Dr
Campbell. His work on oil reserves has long suggested that many official oil
data are either flawed estimates or at worst downright lies. Scandals like
the 23% of ‘lost’ reserves at Royal Dutch Shell have helped to boost
interest in his work.
False reserves threaten the security of energy supply, just
as do bombs under pipelines. Dr Campbell’s conclusion: oil production and
consumption should be regulated by governments. “Many reserve figures are
highly questionable,” says Dr Campbell. “Many great oil fields are
increasingly old and inefficient. But I don’t think oil is easy to produce
with a sniper behind every palm tree.”
“The way to increase energy security is to reduce demand,” he
says. ‘Difficult times’ At ASPO’s recent conference in Berlin, companies
such as BP and Exxon and men such as Fatih Birol, chief economist of the
International Energy Agency, began to talk to the proponents of the peak oil
theory. Whilst they may not agree with Dr Campbell’s theories, their
attendance highlighted ASPO’s emerging importance in the oil debate.
In public, Mr Birol denied that supply would not be able to
meet rising demand, especially from the buoyant economies in the USA, China
and India. But after his speech he seemed to change his tune.
“For the time being there is no spare capacity. But we expect
demand to increase by the fourth quarter (of the year) by three million
barrels a day.”
He pinned his hopes for an increase in production squarely on
troubled Saudi Arabia. “If Saudi does not increase supply by 3 million
barrels a day by the end of the year we will face, how can I say this, it
will be very difficult. We will have difficult times. They must invest.”
Can Saudi deliver?
But even Mr Birol admitted that Saudi production was “about
flat”. Three million extra barrels a day would mean a huge 30% leap in
output in just a few months.
North Sea oil production is in decline
When BBC News Online followed up by asking if this giant
increase in production was actually possible rather than simply a desire he
refused to answer. “You are from the press? This is not for you. This is not
for the press.”
Asking other delegates - admittedly supporters of the peak
oil theory - whether such a steep increase was feasible, the answers were
unambiguous: “absolutely out of the question,” “completely impossible,” and
“3 million barrels - never, not even 300,000.” One delegate laughed so hard
he had to support himself on a table. Some recent figures tend to back up
ASPO’s outlook. North Sea production is declining at an increasing rate,
having peaked in 1999. Not at the predicted flat rate of decline of 7%, but
gradually accelerating from 7% to 8.5% to 11%.
And the number of major new oil fields discovered around the
world fell to zero for the first time in 2003, despite an obvious increase
in technological expertise. “We need transparency with the figures,” says Dr
Campbell. “This avoids profiteering from shortages, the collapse of poor
countries and it will stimulate alternatives.”
“Consumer countries need to be able to audit fields, but at
the same time ‘flat earth’ economists who believe in endless growth need to
change their ideas.” And Dr Campbell has a dire warning: “If the real
figures were to come out there would be panic on the stock markets, in the
end that would suit no one.”
“Paying the Pumper” By J. Robinson West Friday, July
23, 2004; Page A29 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/>
With the return of the highest oil prices since the energy
crisis of the early 1980s, there are growing cries of alarm that the world
is running out of oil. Some speculate that Saudi Arabia has reached maturity
as a producing state and that its production will decline. Others cite the
Hubbert curve, which postulates that once more than 50 percent of reserves
are produced, output inevitably declines.
The world will not run out of oil soon, but there’s still
good reason for alarm. What the world is running short of is production
capacity. There’s plenty of oil—we just can’t get it out of the ground.
It’s important to understand some history to appreciate the problem.
Beginning in the 1960s and continuing through the energy
crisis of the ‘80s, the oil industry was restructured. The Western
international oil companies, which had controlled reserves and production
just about everywhere except the Soviet Union and Mexico, had many of their
largest assets nationalized by governments in such countries as Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Iraq and Venezuela. These governments organized
national oil companies to manage their resources. National companies are
government agencies accountable to their governments first and the
international markets second.
In response, competition among the international firms became
intense as they focused on exploration in places where they were still
permitted to invest: the United States, Canada, the North Sea and Australia.
These companies diversified global oil production to the extent they could.
With the development of sophisticated technology, they moved into deep-water
production, notably in the Gulf of Mexico and off the coast of West Africa.
Whenever a new petroleum province opened for investment, they tried to
enter—in Yemen, Colombia, the Caspian Sea and Russia. The technical and
political risks were immense, and some large investments failed.
The indigenous oil industries in these countries, usually
national companies, resist international foreign investment. They don’t want
the competition, nor do they wish to share the economic rent from the oil.
When oil prices were low, and governments needed money, as in the 1990s,
some foreign investment was permitted in certain countries, often over the
objection of the national company. Substantial production growth resulted.
Oil prices are now high, and most of the national oil companies are capable
of meeting the financial requirements of their governments without foreign
investment or interference.
The world economy is confronted with a situation in which
there are large reserves—more than in 1985 -- but in places where it is hard
to tap them. The international oil industry is the only business in the
world in which global capital cannot invest in the lowest-cost, most
efficient production. National oil companies provide about 60 percent of the
world’s production but control 87 percent of the reserves, and their share
will rise. Many commentators point out that a rising share of our oil will
come from fewer countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Should these
countries continue to maintain their production, or even increase it, as we
expect, there will remain the fundamental problem of increasing production
capacity sufficiently to meet growing world demand. For example, sustained
Saudi production is likely to grow by no more than 3 million barrels per day
over the next 10 years, but worldwide demand, driven by the United States
and China, is expected to grow by 15 million barrels per day.
The capabilities of the national oil companies vary widely.
Some are as competent as the international firms, with excellent management
and efficient operations. Others are deeply corrupt and lack the capital and
skills to meet the sophisticated requirements of portfolio and reservoir
management. Furthermore, exploration for new reserves can involve massive
risks, which most governments are unwilling to underwrite, whereas the
internationals, with huge balance sheets and diversified portfolios, are
quite comfortable with these risks.
The thesis of the Hubbert curve is correct, but the
conclusion that a fall in global oil production has inevitably begun is not.
The Hubbert curve analysis applies where full commercial exploitation has
taken place, but in many areas, other factors, including politics and
policy, weigh in. It is true that production in most of the United States,
Canada and the North Sea is in decline—there, exploration and production
have been exhaustive. But the most oil-rich areas, notably Mexico,
Venezuela, Russia and the Middle East, have not been fully explored.
National oil companies may open up for investment if there
are enough political and economic incentives. Production may also increase
if there are changes in technology. This has happened many times before,
most recently with the development of deep-water technology in the 1980s and
‘90s. One approach includes enhanced oil recovery from existing fields,
where more than 60 percent of the oil often remains in place. Another
breakthrough may come in efficient production from extra-heavy oil and tar
sands, which is now very costly and capital-intensive. There are greater
reserves of extra-heavy oil in Venezuela and Canada than in Saudi Arabia.
Likewise, the industry has been seeking commercial breakthroughs in
gas-to-liquids technology, converting natural gas reserves into ultra-clean
diesel fuel.
Supply will increase if costs remain high long enough to
justify the huge investments necessary. But oil markets have been cyclical
for more than 120 years, and too much investment in capacity, as in the
1970s and ‘80s, inevitably leads to price crashes, followed by further
commercial and political uncertainty.
Virtually every thoughtful policymaker knows that there is a
serious problem in energy, but they are afraid to act. The U.S. government
can do little to increase oil supply, but steps can be taken to reduce
demand. Getting between Americans and their cars is the third rail of
American politics. But if the American people refuse to accept some modest
discomfort now, they will almost certainly be dealing with higher prices and
serious economic disruption later. The obvious solution is for politicians
to gather their courage and tackle demand.
The writer, a former assistant secretary of the interior, is
chairman of PFC Energy, strategic advisers on international oil and gas.
Peering into
oil’s future
Experts try to predict when the world will start running low
on the natural resource that keeps all the engines running
Verne Kopytoff, Chronicle Staff Writer
<mailto:vkopytoff@sfchronicle.com>
Sunday, March 21, 2004
The world began running out of oil soon after the birth of
modern drilling during the 1850s. The question since then has always been:
When will the spigot start drying up? Mounting evidence suggests that an
important turning point may be close. According to several studies, oil
production is expected to begin a permanent decline within a few years,
prompting social and economic upheaval across the globe.
Or maybe not. A rival school of thought says that oil’s
imminent demise is exaggerated and that crude will be plentiful into the
near future.
Whom can you believe? It all depends on how accurate
researchers are in calculating such complex variables as future oil
consumption, production and discovery. “One has to be very skeptical about
any prediction,” said David Goodstein, author of the recently published book
“Out of Gas: The End of Oil,” and a physics professor at California
Institute of Technology in Pasadena.
The numbers that some researchers are relying on “are
extremely undependable” and are being put forth “by companies and countries
that have strong interest in tilting them one way or another,” Goodstein
said.
Worries over falling crude production inevitably arise when
fuel prices spike, as they have recently. Oil futures, at $38.08 per barrel,
are near a 13- year high, while the average price of a gallon of unleaded
gasoline in California hit a record $2.18 earlier this month.
Historically, researchers have been woefully inept at
predicting a permanent decline in global oil production. They have made dire
forecasts since at least the 1920s, only to eat crow as pumping increased.
What researchers are trying to determine is when oil
production will begin to taper off as a natural consequence of dwindling
reserves. At some point, there just won’t be enough oil left to keep
pumping increasing amounts from underground, analysts agree.
As it is, global oil production has grown most years since
the turn of the last century. The world produced nearly 67 million barrels
of oil a day in 2002, up 11 percent from a decade earlier, according to the
U.S. Energy Information Administration. The added crude has fueled economies
across the globe, including the United States, and enabled millions of new drivers to take to
the road. Without the new supplies, oil and gasoline would undoubtedly cost
a lot more.
But the era of abundance is in peril, judging from an
important industry yardstick. More oil is being produced each year than
discovered. It’s similar to when you spend more money than you bring in.
Unless the pattern changes, your bank account will eventually run dry. The
trend started in 1986, according to IHS Energy, an energy research firm
based in Houston. The only exception since then was 1991, when a big field
in the Persian Gulf, off the coast of Iran, was discovered.
“There are discoveries being made all the time, but they are
smaller and smaller,” said Jim Meyer, director of the Oil Depletion Analysis
Center, a London organization that disseminates information about the threat
of dwindling supplies. “The big fields have all been found, or at least
they’re few and far between.” If big reserves are to be found anywhere, they
will likely be in the former Soviet Union and in the polar regions,
according to analysts.Libya, Iran and Iraq, all of which have been largely
unexplored in recent years, are also possibilities.
The ebb and flow of oil production is known as the “Hubbert’s
Peak,” after M. King Hubbert, a Shell geologist. He gained fame for
correctly predicting in 1956 that U.S. production would peak in the early
1970s and then decline. Hubbert’s theory is that oil production, when
plotted on a chart, is a bell curve. Production rises quickly as big,
cheap-to-operate fields open. It flattens out as those fields become
depleted. New, smaller, more costly fields can’t offset the loss, leading to
the curve’s inevitable decline.
Differing dates
Today’s generation of oil researchers is applying Hubbert’s
principles to global production. They agree that pumping will eventually
peak worldwide, but they differ widely on exactly when.
Colin Campbell, a retired geologist in Ireland who has worked
throughout the oil industry, including Texaco, BP and Amoco, says the peak
will come before 2010. It may be already happening, he said, given that
global oil production has declined slightly since 2000. Some researchers say
the drop is a temporary and deliberate response by oil producers to cut back
because of the bad economy and lower demand.
Campbell, however, believes that virtually all nations are
pumping at full capacity. “I think we may live to see that 2000 may have
been the peak,” Campbell said. “We’re hitting capacity again now—oil prices
are surging. It’s reasonable to think that by 2010, you will have a volatile
period of recession, oil spikes and price shocks.”
The U.S. Energy Information Administration paints a different
picture. The agency, part of the Department of Energy, pegged the peak at
anywhere between 2021 and 2112. The wide time frame takes into account 12
scenarios. Different assumptions about production growth and reserve size
produce different peaks.
The earliest peak, in 2021, is achieved with 3 percent annual
growth in crude production and relatively low reserves. The latest peak, in
2112, assumes no production growth and big reserves.
Pete Stark, vice president of industry relations for IHS
Energy, agrees with the Energy Information Administration that there is no
immediate crisis. Production won’t crest until at least 2020, and probably
much later, he said. “We don’t see it as much of a peak, but more of a
plateau,” Stark said. “It’s not a calamitous situation. It’s one we have
time to adjust to.”
The oil industry operates under the assumption that peak oil
production is decades away, if not more. John Felmy, an economist with the
American Petroleum Institute, an industry trade group, characterized more
imminent forecasts as “Chicken Little predictions.”
Part of the reason researchers are so divided is that there
is no standard formula to determine oil reserves. Instead, they rely on a
range of estimates of how much oil is available to pump. For example, the
U.S. Geological Survey says that there are up to 3.9 trillion barrels.
Campbell estimates reserves at about half that amount.
The biggest known onshore and offshore reserves are in Saudi
Arabia, followed by Canada and Iraq, according to the Oil & Gas Journal.
Unreliable numbers Reserve figures provided by oil companies are often
unreliable, according to some analysts. To meet Wall Street expectations,
the companies sometimes understate or overstate the totals, the analyst
said. In the past couple of weeks, for example, Royal/Dutch Shell has
lowered the numbers for its proven reserves twice, for a total of more than
20 percent, forcing the resignation of the firm’s chairman. Company
executives had designated some oil and natural gas as likely to be pumped
when in fact drilling was questionable.
Securities and Exchange Commission rules require companies to
include only oil that is “likely recoverable” in their proven reserves.
However, the rules apply only to firms that trade publicly in the United
States.
Getting clarity on reserves is further clouded by figures
provided
by oil- producing countries with nationalized industries,
according to analysts. Some countries, especially members of OPEC, have
raised reserve estimates significantly without explanation or have reported
the same reserves several years in a row, apparently failing to deduct
ongoing drilling. “It’s a minefield,” said Meyer, from the Oil Depletion
Analysis Center. Researchers generally factor additional oil from future
discoveries into their calculations. But potential improvements in
technology, such as the ability to drill deeper from offshore platforms and
the extra oil it may produce, are not usually considered.
Analysts readily admit that future developments in the oil
industry might require them to adjust their forecasts. Indeed, the peak in
production may be further off than they currently believe, they concede.
However, pushing the date more than a few years into the
future would require the discovery of vast quantities of oil, according to
Meyer. Only finding the equivalent of a Saudi Arabia or two would make a
significant difference, he said.
“Even if these near-term forecasts are off by a decade, this
should still be of public concern,” Meyer said.
Some elected officials, including President Bush, have
advocated opening parts of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in Alaska for
drilling to help make the United States less dependent on imports and to
help lower oil prices. An Energy Information Administration report released
last week said up to 876, 000 barrels of crude a day could be produced in
the refuge by 2025.
On a global scale, the amount would comprise less than 1
percent of all production expected in that year. The added drilling, if it
ever happens, would do little to offset a decline in world oil production,
according to analysts. Some of the analysts who foresee imminent drops in
oil production advocate making greater use of alternative sources of energy,
including nuclear, geothermal and biomass. They all call for conservation.
“One thing we could do now is use less oil now, and that can
certainly help soften the blow and put off the peak,” said Goodstein, the
author and Cal Tech professor. Felmy, the industry economist, said oil
companies already have initiatives to develop fuel cells, windmills and
solar and hydrogen power. He was especially enthusiastic about the potential
for frozen methane, which he described as abundant in permafrost and
underwater.
Stark, from IHS Energy, was sanguine about doomsday
scenarios. Even in the improbable event that no new oil is discovered, he
said, the world can continue consuming existing reserves at the current pace
for another 106 years.
Table (1) Oil production and reserves
Some researchers are predicting that oil production will
begin to decline within a few years. The following charts show current
production and known reserves.
Top world oil producers, 2002 -- In millions of barrels
per day
United States - 9.08
Saudi Arabia - 8.54
Russia - 7.65
Mexico - 3.61
Iran - 3.54
China - 3.37
Norway - 3.33
Canada - 2.94
Venezuela - 2.91
United Kingdom - 2.55
United Arab Emirates - 2.38
Nigeria - 2.12
Iraq - 2.04
Kuwait - 2.03
Table (2):. Countries with the biggest oil reserves, 2003
In billions of barrels
Saudi Arabia - 261.8
Canada - 180.02
Iraq - 112.5
United Arab Emirates - 97.8
Kuwait - 96.5
Iran - 89.7
Venezuela - 77.8
Russia - 60
Libya - 29.5
Nigeria - 24
United States - 22.67
China - 18.25
Qatar - 15.2
Mexico - 12.62.
Sources: Energy Information Administration, Oil & Gas
Journal, Map: ESRICHART (3):
IS OIL PRODUCTION ABOUT TO DECLINE?
Oil production has mostly increased to satisfy the world?s
growing appetite for crude. If predictions are correct, production may soon
begin to decline, sending the line on this chart downward permanently.
Table (3)
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